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Did Mobil and Georgia-Pacific Get Away With Murder?
By asbestoshub | August 12, 2008
A case on appeal in Illinois, First District, Fifth Division, Cook County, was affirmed in favor of Exxon Mobil and Georgia-Pacific Corporation, Defendants in an asbestos-related lawsuit filed by Stacey Gregory, on behalf of her late husband, Larry Gregory.
Mrs. Gregory filed a complaint in Illinois against Defendants including Beazer East, Bondex International, Exxon Mobil, Georgia-Pacific Corporation and Union Carbide Corporation, regarding Mr. Gregory’s contraction of mesothelioma and subsequent death.
Mobil moved for summary judgment on various grounds, and the trial court granted this motion finding that Mobil owed no duty to Mr. Gregory.
Meanwhile, Union Carbide moved for the application of Indiana law rather than Illinois law, and Georgia-Pacific joined in this motion.
The trial court granted the motion, finding that choice-of-law factors in the cause favored Indiana law. Georgia-Pacific subsequently moved for summary judgment based on the Indiana statute of repose, and the trial court granted the motion finding that Indiana’s statute of repose barred Mrs. Gregory’s claim against Georgia-Pacific.
A statute of repose is different from a statute of limitations, in that after the statutory period has expired it is not possible to file a lawsuit even if an injury occurs after that time. For example, if there is a twenty year statute of repose on the manufacture of aircraft, a claim cannot be filed against the manufacturer more than twenty years after the date of manufacture, even if a design or manufacturing defect is responsible for a later accident.
Bondex, Union Carbide, and Beazer were all dismissed as parties, leaving Mobil and Georgia-Pacific as relevant defendants.
On appeal from the grant of Mobil’s motion for summary judgment and Georgia-Pacific’s motion for the application of Indiana law, Mrs. Gregory contended that the trial court erred in finding that Mobil owed no duty to Mr. Gregory to warn him of the presence of asbestos in its facility where he worked and that the trial court erred when it determined that Indiana law applied to the claim against Georgia-Pacific for manufacturing and selling its joint compound without including a warning that this product contained asbestos.
Mrs. Gregory asked that the Appeals Court reverse the order granting summary judgment to Mobil and remand the matter for further proceedings.
Mrs. Gregory also asked that the Appeals Court reverse the order finding that Indiana law applies and enter judgment that Illinois law applies and, accordingly, reverse the order granting summary judgment to Georgia-Pacific.
Alternatively, Mrs. Gregory asked the Appeals Court that it reverse the order finding that Indiana law applies, reverse the grant of summary judgment to Georgia-Pacific, remand the matter for further proceedings, and grant any other appropriate relief.
The Appeals Court affirmed both the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Mobil and its order in favor of Georgia-Pacific finding that Indiana law applies.
In other words, for whatever reason, the Court chose to apply Indiana law, perhaps the exposure occurred in Indiana. Then the Indiana statute of repose laws became applicable, barring Mrs. Gregory’s claim against Georgia-Pacific, despite (or perhaps because of) common knowledge that mesothelioma diseases occur decades after exposure. The last bit of bad luck for Mrs. Gregory came when it was decided for whatever reason that Exxon Mobil owed no duty to warn Mr. Gregory of asbestos in their products, perhaps he was a contractor and not an employee.
Did Exxon Mobil and Georgia-Pacific get away with murder by exploiting loopholes in the system or was it just bad luck when the application of Indiana law and other circumstances prevent a widow from making an asbestos claim on behalf of her deceased husband? Submit your comments.
